Annual 4 Chapter 1 Part 2

Mussolini had originally wanted a general entry ban for "alien Jews" in conjunction with the expulsion law. He relented, however, in response to the urging of the ministries, which did not want to jeopardize transit and tourism as a source of income for Italian shipping lines.86 Embarkation from Genoa and Naples to North and South America, particularly also from Trieste to Palestine and also to an increasing extent Shanghai, continued without disturbance. 87 Initially the determination of the length of residence for "tourism, embarkation, medical treatment, and business purposes" (soggiorno per ragioni di turismo, diporto, cura ed affari) was entrusted to the questura that processed the residence declarations. This arrangement continued until the Ministry of the Interior made a unified regulation in the second half of October that stipulated a maximum stay of three months. But barely four weeks later the Directorate for Tourism at the Ministry of Propaganda requested that the length of residence be extended to six months, and this was actually accepted by the Ministry of the Interior.88 In February the Foreign Office introduced for the owners of J-passports [passports stamped with a J to indicate a Jew] compulsory visas for transit and tourist visits. If the authorities expected the Jewish clientele to remain faithful to their traditional vacation resorts and spas after the enactment of racial legislation, they revealed considerable naivete, overconfidence, and lack of sensitivity. On the other hand, the Italians were dependent on every tourist, because in the wake of the Munich Pact the increasing danger of war was causing international tourism to stagnate. Thus, for instance, the Italian National Tourist Office in Berlin reported that, apart from Jews, it was almost impossible to interest any German tourist in a trip to Italy.89

Initially little use was made of the tourist visa for the purpose of escaping persecution, because race legislation and fear of expulsion acted as deterrents. But many would probably have made the trip to the Italian Consulate to have such a visa stamped into their passports, just in case. Up to 12 March, the number of persons entering Italy can hardly have exceeded 1000. But when it turned out that the feared mass expulsion was not forthcoming, the numbers shot up. One set of statistics for residence declarations by German citizens with J-passports mentions 539 in June 1939, 984 in July, and 1,274 in August; most of the latter had arrived by the first half of August.90 The Ministry of the Interior, after trying to find out the reasons for the new influx, concluded that the newcomers were predominantly destitute refugees who had been released a short time before from concentration camps to which they had been taken after the pogrom of November 1938. They were threatened with reinternment in a concentration camp if they had not fled across the border within a few days.91

Thus fascist Italy despite its race laws and threat of expulsion remained the sanctuary of the desperate. In response to the new wave of refugees- approximately 2,000 persons within six weekson 19 August the Ministry of the Interior, in a circular to the prefects, suspended residence permits for tourism. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda also approved this policy shift, since they were now convinced that the tourism policy had been an incalculable fiasco.92

Of the 3,053 "alien Jews" who were still in Italy, having entered the country on a tourist visa, there were 1,904 German citizens-most of them in reality Austrians-385 Poles, 223 "former Czechoslovakians" who had found their way to Italy shortly before the total occupation of their country on 16 March, and 120 stateless persons, in contrast to genuine tourists consisting of 10 Swiss, 9 Americans, 9 British, and 6 French. 93 Altogether there were probably barely 5,000 personsJews, converts, and Mischlinge who were threatened by the same infamous race policy and had escaped from Nazi domination using tourist visas.

After suspending the expulsion decree and abrogating the planned mass expulsion, the Ministry of the Interior found other ways to get rid of both the Jewish emigrants and refugees. To a large extent it used expulsion "at your own risk and at your own peril" (a loro rischio e loro pericolo), in particular on the Yugoslavian, Swiss, and especially the French borders. In the words of the Italian police, the formula "at your own risk and your own peril" meant that border officials took refugees to an unguarded place on the other side of the border, from where with some luck they could reach the interior of the country undetected. This practice was based on a telegram of 28 January 1939 to the prefects that stated: "By higher order, it is decreed that the exit of Jews who wish to settle abroad be accorded maximal facilitation."94

The questura then sent small groups to border police stations, led them to an unguarded place, or handed them over to train officials and local guides. Many emigrants and refugees had also come on their own to the border in the hope of secretly being able to cross because they had heard of the "helpful attitude" of the Italian border officials. Along the Italian side of the border the exit was formally legal: border and customs officials carried out the usual controls and assured themselves that papers were in order and that exit regulations were observed. For the countries of destination, however, it was a matter of an illegal infiltration. At the French border near Ventimiglia this had already started before 12 March and occurred with fun knowledge of the prefect of Imperia. Between 1 March and 14 August he reported a total of 378 persons had been brought across the border "in the highland region of Ventimiglia . . . without the visa of a French consulate" and an additional twelve had been put aboard ships to France.95

In contrast, Renzo Luisada, secretary of the recently disbanded Milan Aid Committee, COMASEBIT, told the American Consul General Sholes in September that approximately 800 Jewish refugees had recently left Italy, "mostly across the border of Ventimiglia, with the tacit support of the authorities."96 In view of these events the French strengthened their border patrols and sent back a number of refugees who had been seized by them. On 11 July the prefect of Imperia therefore urged the Ministry of the Interior to stop the practice of having the questura send refugees across the border.97

To obtain more precise insight into the events that seemed to elude the prefects, the Ministry of the Interior dispatched a General Inspector for Public Security to the border. His report brought to light that a share of the Jews who had been infiltrated into France had arrived in Italy only a short time before on tourist visas.98 This caused alarm in Rome. The "maximal facilitation" with which the Jews were to be inconspicuously gotten rid of had instead encouraged the flood.

Parallel to this officially controlled movement, there was also an effort by local smugglers and petty criminals between Ventimiglia and Bordigheria that tried to profit from the illicit border traffic and to elude official control. One would like to assume, even though it is not specifically confirmed, that the Milan Committee did not want to renege on the request of Jewish organizations in Berlin and Vienna to protect those persons who had been released from the concentration camps from being rearrested and returned to the camps. Renzo Luisada and Raffaela Cantoni (who was the pivotal spirit of the COMASEBIT and, as a known antifascist, remained in the background) must have known the risks. The blow was not long in coming: On 24 July Bocchini on orders from Mussolini commanded the prefect of Milan to dissolve the Committee. This occurred on 29 August.99

The debarkations to France via motorboats and fishing vessels were resumed between December 1939 and May 1940. This traffic continued under two auspices: officially regulated by the police and uncontrolled in the hands of local profiteers. Two or three transports were stopped just prior to debarkation. In other cases, the organizers, sailors, fishermen, and hotel porters were tracked down and arrested.100 Meanwhile, in December 1939 the Delegazione per l'Assistenza agli Emigranti, or DELASEM, which was the successor organization to COMASEBIT and was directly subordinate to the Union of Jewish Communities of Italy, even developed plans for illegal debarkation to Spain, which were probably never implemented.101

The growing stream of refugees in the summer of 1939, which led to the suspension of tourist visas on 19 August, had fateful consequences. One set of statistics of the Ministry of the Interior in late September made clear that of the approximately 9,000 persons affected by the expulsion decree (the figures vacillate between 8,807 and 9,170), 6,480 had meanwhile left Italy, while 2,360 (including 829 Germans and Austrians, 415 Poles, and 516 stateless persons) were still in Italy. At the same time, research revealed that an additional 2,486 persons were still in Italy on tourist visas. The authorities were aware that the total figure of 4,846 persons had hardly changed since 12 March.102

Mussolini wanted to stop this development under any circumstances. Deportation across the Yugoslavian, Swiss, and French borders became increasingly difficult because of fighter controls. It also did not show the desired success-indeed, it had even encouraged an increased influx of so- called tourists to Italy; therefore, the police chief impressed upon the prefects and questors that all persons who were in the country on tourist visas were there illegally and ordered them deported "at their own risk and at their own peril" to the "border of their entry" (frontiera di provenienza).103 It can be proven that the Ministry of the Interior ordered over 300 deportations to the German border. The larger share of these was not carried out, however, because the prefects and questors frequently acceded to Jewish committees' and congregations' pleas and shrank from this most extreme measure.104 in Genoa, for instance, whose questura was considered the most liberal in Italy, it is believed that only 12 deportations to the German border occurred, among them eight former inmates of Dachau and Buchenwald.105

The increasing cases of such deportations caused great alarm among the Jewish committees and the Union of the Jewish Communifies of Italy, and they thus turned to American Ambassador Phillips. On 8 December he spoke with Ciano, who asked him for a memorandum to present to Mussolini.106 Phillips was astonished to find that Mussolini was accessible and that contrary to expectations, the Duce promised to stop the deportations to the German border although Phillips' personal request was not an official demarche of the State Department.107 We cannot say that Mussolini made substantial concessions, since the influx caused by the suspension of tourist visas had independently come to a standstill. Moreover, the German police refused entry to the Jews who had been sent back by the Italian authorities and thus the number of refugees in Tarvisio (border crossing to Germany) started to mount.108

Foreign Minister Ciano implemented Mussolini's decision, relaying it within four days to the police chief, Bocchini. When Bocchini objected, Ciano silenced him with the argument that the residence extension "must be understood in the spirit of generosity that dictated the Duce's decision." On 24 December the Ministry of the Interior instructed the prefects to stop the deportations along the German border.109 The refugees in Italy were saved, but the tug-of war over the new arrivals continued.

The circular of 19 August did not mean a general entrance ban for those being hounded by the Nazis, since transit for purposes of debarkation from Italian ports was still possible. During the period of Italian neutrality, it constituted one of the last loopholes through which Jews could escape from Germany and annexed or occupied countries. Transit visas also facilitated illegal entry into Italy. Consulates of foreign countries in the interior of Nazi territory issued "courtesy visas," for which high sums were paid in many instances. Boat tickets and passports were falsified in incalculable numbers. In Italy, the police uncovered several forgery rings-usually emigrants working together with Italians.110 Increasingly the Italian consulates, particularly in Amsterdam, Zurich, Warsaw, and Katowice, issued visas that did not meet their own regulations. They did so, for instance, by issuing transit visas for already expired tourist visas or by recognizing visas for other countries that were to have been approved by foreign consulates in Italy after arrival.

The Ministry of the Interior was soon made very aware of the new situation by the border police, who had evidently already turned back numerous persons along the border. In response to the protest by the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Office, strengthened by Mussolini's decision, responded that entry was to be granted even if it was noticed during border control that the visa had been issued "erroneously"; this was not to be held against the holder of the visa.111

The Foreign Office therefore shielded the Italian consulates abroad and at the same time indirectly protected the refugees. But the Ministry of the Interior did not give in and made certain that the refugees began to feel its disapproval. In this manner the questura granted them a stay of only a few days, telling them that they had entered by deception and would again be deported. There were soon renewed deportations, particularly in Trieste, where several hundred refugees had gradually arrived. In Tarvisio a Polish- Jewish emigrant was even handed over to the German police, which was something that had never happened before.112 In order to be able to control developments, starting on 23 February 1940 the Ministry of the Interior published statistics on the number of persons stranded with transit visas, showing that up to the end of May there were probably 592 such persons.113 On 23 April the Foreign Office initially nullified transit visas for "Polish Jews," since they had discovered the greatest number of irregularities among this group.114 On 18 May the Ministry of the Interior finally issued a general entry ban affecting all "alien Jews."115

The constant pressure of the threat of expulsion since the autumn of 1938 as well as the possibility of entry into Italy on a tourist or transit visa led to numerous attempts at illegal immigration from Italy to Palestine under the auspices of the Aliyah Bet.116 The failure of several departures from Italy explains why preference was later given to Danube and Black Sea ports. The Italian Foreign Office initially had no reservations, provided that the refugees' entrance papers to Italy were in order and that Italian customs authorities controlled their departure. After the outbreak of the World War, however, the Foreign Office made a far-reaching agreement with the British Embassy in Rome that guaranteed transit via Trieste for holders of Palestine certificates, making it possible to save more than 2,500 persons.117 The Foreign Office realized that tolerating illegal transports would have jeopardized this agreement. From the beginning, however, the decisive resistance came from the Ministry of the Navy and the port officials. They maintained that Italy, as a signatory to the International Convention for the Protection of Human Life at Sea of 1929, could not permit ships that did not meet specifications to be used for passenger traffic from Italian ports. They warned that accidents might harm the Italian reputation. The numerous tragedies of the later Palestine-bound ships showed that their apprehension was justified.118 Greek and Yugoslavian shipowners evading Italian port authorities took the risks of carrying passengers ashore along the Palestinian coast in worn-out freighters and tugboats. The Italian port authorities refused these vessels permission to sail, mandated renovations, and imposed a limited number of passengers that would have made the trip unprofitable for the shipowners. Repeatedly, ships whose arrival had already been announced failed to show or were turned back by the port authorities, and thus the number of prospective passengers waiting in the harbor towns increased steadily. Then the Ministry of the Interior also adopted the position of opposing the transports "in the interests of public security." It was nevertheless possible for several ships to put out to sea between September 1938 and January 1940. In the cases of the "Agia Zoni" in Fiume and the "Atrato" in Naples, the prefects gave orders to the port authorities for the ships to leave even though neither of the ships had complied with the regulations.119 In this way, they wanted to get rid of the Jews who had already arrived. As the prefect of Fiume stated, "they offered a not very edifying drama."

Usually it was the revisionist Zionists who were behind the transports, both those that succeeded and those that failed. In one instance it was the Irgun, the armed underground organization in Palestine, with which they were allied; in two instances it was the Mossad.120 In the spring of 1939, the COMASEBIT was also involved in the preparation for a transport that probably was carried Out.121 in early 1940 the DELASEM approached the Ministry of Interior with a project that dealt with exits from Italy but not with transit. However, the Foreign Office now raised objections because it did not want to jeopardize the agreement with the British concerning legal exits via Trieste.122 There is documented evidence of the departure of a total of 1,720 persons on six ships from Italian ports under the auspices of the Ahyah Bet. This number included mainly Jews from Poland who probably reached their destinations in Palestine.

Since the onset of racial legislation, social conditions for the Jewish emigrants and refugees had changed, becoming steadily more serious and desperate. Up to that time, most of the single persons and heads of families had lived from their own earnings, although frequently in very modest circumstances. In late 1939 DELASEM noted that an average of only 2.7 percent of the refugees' income came from their own earnings, and that this money was usually earned illegally at occasional jobs.123

The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that after the outbreak of war cash transfers from Poland and Slovakia were stopped, and there were delays in money transfers from France, England, and the United States. Those who had escaped the Nazi terror with a tourist visa and those who had been released from concentration camps arrived completely penniless, since draconian Nazi currency regulations allowed them to export only ten Reichsmarks, a sum barely adequate for initial living expenses. The refugees usually went straight from the train station to the nearest aid committee, whose address they had prior to departure. Since the aid committees were able at most to provide one-third or one-fourth of their living expenses, the Jewish refugees increasingly lived by drawing on their last savings, selling their last valuables, even their last possessions such as warm winter clothing because they feared the seemingly distant onset of winter less than hunger. Many were no longer able to pay rent, and thus slept in parks and public facilities, always in danger of being seized and taken to the German border. The reports include references to very primitive accommodations, overcrowded and unheated rooms.124 In the winter of 1939-1940 there was a clothing shortage everywhere. Nourishing food was exorbitantly expensive, and frequently a day's rations consisted only of bread, tea, and a plate of soup. The result was undernourishment, emaciation, and increased susceptibility to disease, especially tuberculosis. One group waited in vain in Brindisi for debarkation with an illegal transport to Palestine but then realized that they had been swindled. They starved, living from stolen grapes and from leftover vegetables, fruit, and fish, which they picked up after the food market had closed. The boarding house owners had evicted them, keeping their luggage as security.125 For all emigrant and refugee Jews there was, in addition, the constant psychological pressure of the threat of deportation. In the event of widespread deportations, it was feared there would be a number of suicides. Lelio Vittorio Valobra, the director of DELASEM, wrote to the American Jewish joint Distribution Committee (hereafter Joint) that he feared the refugees' deteriorating health and general demoralization would make it impossible for them to build a new life after emigration.126

The alarming impoverishment of the emigrant and refugee Jews can be seen from the fact that the Milan Committee in 1937 was paying living expenses for an average of 149 persons per month, while by November 1939 they were supporting 1,434 people.127 Of the approximately 4,000 emigrant and refugee Jews in all of Italy, approximately 3,000 required assistance. As a result of the dissolution of COMASEBIT in late August 1939, new problems arose for financial disbursements to Jewish refugees. Chief Rabbi Gustavo Castelbolognesi of Milan assumed the relief work, but complained in a letter to the Joint that he did not feel able to do this unfamiliar work. Under this protection the former employees of COMASEBIT therefore continued to work illegally.128

Because of the impoverishment of Italian Jews resulting from unemployment, exclusion from the professions, conversion, and emigration, the Jewish communities no longer considered themselves in a position to contribute significant amounts. They already had their hands full in assisting their own Italian co-religionists. The situation could only be ameliorated if foreign Jewish organizations helped. The New York Joint responded to the appeals. But even joint was not in a position to fulfill the most urgent needs because its aid program extended to all persecuted Jews in Europe, and outside Italy they disbursed substantial funds. The DELASEM operated on the basis of a minimum payment of 12 dollars (240 lire) per month to cover living expenses. With 3,000 dependents, that would have come to a total of $36,000.129 The joint transferred $13,000 in August 1939 and $8,000 in September and in October.130 The Italian committees were therefore not able to spend more than 2 lire daily, or 60 lire monthly per person.

The extreme emergency in Italy also attracted the attention of church and other charitable organizations. In February 1940 a representative of the Quakers arrived in Rome, soon thereafter opening an office that functioned until July 1941.131 Although Italian Catholics did not create their own committee, in June 1940 the Vatican delegated a representative of the Saint Raphael Society who resided in the Convent of the Pallottine Fathers in Rome to coordinate the further migration of "non-Aryan Catholics" from Italy to North and South America.132 After the founding of DELASEM in early December 1939 and the suspension of the deportations following the intervention by Ambassador Phillips, the situation became somewhat less tense but continued to remain serious.

4. Internment, Deportation, and Survival

Immediately after Italy's entrance into the war on 10 June 1940, the fascist government undertook measures for the internment of enemy aliens, thereby following the example of Germany, France, and Great Britain. In contrast to the taking of prisoners in war, the internment of civilians in wartime was not regulated by any international convention. It was undertaken to assist domestic and military security, to hinder espionage, and to impede men of draft age from leaving the country and joining the enemy army.

In France, the internment of the German refugees together with Nazis living abroad was based on the simple logic that they were all ,/enemy aliens." Diaries and memoirs provide evidence of the shock experienced by emigrants upon internment in countries that had nevertheless provided reluctant asylum. 133

Starting in mid-August 1939, even before the outbreak of war, the Italian authorities made the first preparations for civilian internment. It appears that the measures were drafted with one eye to entering the war.134 Initially, in May 1940, Italian documents mention the potential internment of immigrant and refugee Jews. Toward the end of the month, the Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior, Guido Buffarini-Guidi, sent a brief note to the police chief, Arturo Bocchini, in which he stated: "The Duce wishes that, in case of war, concentration camps also be prepared for the Jews."135 A short time later the Foreign Office, referring to similar measures in Germany, communicated its approval to the police officials in the Ministry of the Interior to treat "alien Jews" the same way as citizens of enemy countries and also to intern all "German Jews as well as the Jews from the countries that had fallen under German domination." Expulsion was supported only for Jews from neutral nations.136 Although initially internment in itself had nothing to do with racial policy, the inclusion of Jews from Axis countries changed this.

On 15 June, five days after Italy's entry into the war, the Ministry of the Interior in a telegram to the prefects ordered the arrest of all "German, Polish, Czechoslovakian, and stateless Jews between the age of 18 and 60" and their transfer into internment camps. The women and children were to be removed from their place of residence and sent to remote small villages, where they were to be in "free internment" under police supervision.137 There is no proof of any discussions between the Italian and the German authorities about the internment of Jews.138

In many provinces the arrests resembled the "Night and Fog" operation. Early in the morning the affected persons were taken from their apartments and quarters by the police and brought to the questura. Usually many hours passed before they were delivered to the local prison, where they were placed in close proximity with each other, although they were sometimes also locked up with common criminals. Frequently the cells were overcrowded, lacking the most basic sanitary facilities, and infested with vermin. Probably most oppressive of all was the uncertainty about what the Italian authorities intended. Only during transport did many prisoners recognize that they were traveling south and not being deported to the German border. Prison was viewed as a very bad experience, and in contrast the ensuing internment meant a clarification, relief, and improvement of their situation.139

Transport by train from the prisons to the internment camps was in small groups under police surveillance. Often on the way from prison to the railroad station the Jews were handcuffed, but such chains were removed during the trip. In many cases family members were notified of the departure time so they could say farewell to their husbands, sometimes for many years or forever, at the train station. Women and children were as a rule not arrested but were ordered to be prepared for internment on a fixed date. They had received official police orders, known as the foglio di via obbligatorio, on which they were informed about the prefecture of their destination.140

The Italian "concentration camps" for civilian internees were similar only in name to the German concentration camps. There was only one barracks camp built for internment, located at FerramontiTarsia, north of Cosenza in Calabria.141 In all other instances requisitioned or rented buildings were used- doisters, hospices, camps, large movie houses, and empty villas-that could accommodate from 30 to 200 persons. In the last months prior to liberation, only Ferramonti-Tarsia contained more than 2,000 internees, including approximately 1,500 Jews.142 Documents from the Ministry of the Interior in March 1942 reveal the existence of 25 camps where "alien Jews" were interned, but between 1940 and 1943 the total number of internment camps never exceeded 40.143

Except for the two camps of Montechiarugolo and Scipione di Salsomaggiore in the province of Parma, all other internment camps were located in the middle and southern parts of Italy, mainly in the provinces of Campobasso, Macerata, Chieti, and Teramo in the Abruzzi, where winter was very harsh. In the province of Teramo alone there were seven camps: Civitella del Tronto, Isola di Gran Sasso, Nereto, Tortoreto, Notaresco, Tossicia, and Corropoh.144 The camps situated farthest south were Campagna in Salerno province, Alberobello and Gioia del Colle in Bari province, and FerramontiTarsia. Only in 12 places were the Jews separated from other foreigners. There were a total of seven separate women's camps: Lanciano in Chieti province, Pollenza, Treia, and Petriolo in Macerata province, Vinchiaturo and Casacalenda in Campobasso province, and Solofra in Avellino province. They had been built in part to hold prostitutes, who were considered potentially guilty of espionage because of their association with the military But they also housed women who had been registered as politically unreliable in official dossiers.

In all the women's camps the Jews were put together with other foreigners. The only camp for both men and women was FerramontiTarsia where, starting in late 1940, family barracks were built, but these were not large enough to unite all families separated during internment. Internees were constantly moved around, and very few were held in only one place.

Starting in 1941, internees had the possibility of requesting release into "free internment." Many hoped thus to find better living conditions, especially in Northern Italy. People could request the province they preferred.145 In this manner, many emigrants and refugees who otherwise would have been liberated by the Allies came under German occupation and were deported.

In the internment decree of 4 September 1940 ("Regulations for the Treatment of Interned Nationals of Enemy States") it is expressly noted: "The internees are to be treated humanely and protected against offense and force.146 With few exceptions, this principle was in fact followed, and there were no differences noticed in the treatment of Jews and non-Jews. Methodical atrocities and tortures, common in the German concentration camps, were not known in Italy. There were, however, isolated individual instances of beating, kicking, and slapping, usually the result of lack of self- control and excitement by Italian guards; such behavior met the disapproval of the camp directors, who transferred personnel for such incidents.147

As a whole the relationship of the camp commandants and guards to the Jews who had found refuge in Italy was relaxed, whereas their relationship with Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Corsicans deported for political reasons was harsher. Resistance by the latter was sometimes suppressed with force, or even by use of firearms.148 The internment decree also permitted the free practice of religion.

Nevertheless, internment in a camp meant a severe restriction of personal freedom, similar to prison. People were separated from their families, apartments, their familiar social and occupational surroundings; and arbitrarily tossed together depending upon the momentary capacity of the camp. The camps were guarded, even though many had no barbed wire. Only in exceptional cases-for instance, for urgently needed medical treatment-was an exit permit issued. Resistance to camp regulations usually led to transfer to a stricter camp for political prisoners on one of the islands off the Italian mainland.149 As a rule the internees were not permitted to work but received for their maintenance a daily allowance of 6.50 lire, an amount that was scaled to the needs of the poor rural populace and was increased several times to compensate for the progressive inflation.150 The allowance barely sufficed for food and left hardly anything for the replacement of worn-out clothing and other items of daily need.

By performing services and manual chores for fellow inmates or selling products from gift packages, it was possible to acquire additional income. But when the supply difficulties increased during the war and the regular allotment of food supplies no longer reached the camps, there was at times famine.

The deplorable hygienic conditions and the shortage of heating in winter months frequently led to illness, and many internees suffered permanent damage to their health.151 Considering the monotony of camp life and the isolation from normal surroundings, described in diaries and records of that time, the situation of the internees can only be called miserable and humiliating. This can be affirmed, although many reports written later under the impact of news about the Nazi extermination camps make the Italian situation sound relatively bearable.152

Ferramonti-Tarsia, the largest camp, which at times also resembled a ghetto, warrants particular attention. Against the clear reservations of the health authorities, it had been erected on a swampy, malariainfested alluvial site near the Crati River. After heavy rain in winter and spring, the terrain turned into mud, and temperatures around 104 F prevailed in the summer.153 According to an American report written after liberation, from the time of arrival of the first internees in June 1940 until the end of 1943 there were 820 cases of malaria and 109 of jaundice. Fortunately the type of malaria was not severe or fatal, so no deaths resulted, but it suffices to imagine that the feverish victims lay for weeks on their cots without having the necessary nourishment or sufficient medications. Altogether 37 persons died from illnesses, which was not much higher than the average among the local population.154

Ferramonti-Tarsia was under the direction of a police commissar who was directly responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Under this supervision there developed a self-governing system by the internees which, as surprising as it may seem in a fascist country, was based on democratic principles. A meeting of the barracks representatives was held to elect the camp spokesman and the persons responsible for the various commissions such as those for health, school, and culture.155 The camp administration granted considerable latitude to prisoner self-government and was basically concerned that the Ministry of the Interior would intervene.

Gradually the internees set up a school, a kindergarten, a pharmacy, a medical station, three synagogues, one Catholic and one Greek-Orthodox chapel (for the deportees arriving from Greece after 1941). With donations from the Mensa dei Bambini, a private philanthropic relief organization in Milan, a concert grand piano was acquired. As was the case in several French internment camps, an active cultural life developed, with theatrical performances and musical events that were attended by the officials of the police along with their wives and children.156 A considerable number of marriages were also celebrated in Ferramonti-Tarsia, frequently motivated in part by the wish to obtain one of the sought-after family barracks, and 25 children were born there.157

The situation of "free internment," which was mainly for women and children, greatly depended on local conditions. The description of life in a Calabresian village in the famous novel Christ Stopped at Eboli by Carlo Levi- the author himself was interned for political reasons-applies to the emigrant and refugee Jews in internment. In the villages in the South there were as a rule no running water, no modem sanitary facilities, no electric light, and no telephone. People used a basin filled with dried almond shells or pieces of charcoal, the braciere, for warming their hands. Mattresses were hardly usablepeople slept on straw or on a straw sack placed on a wooden bedstead.

The ability to leave the internment homes and the amount of time permitted in free local excursions were determined by the local police, to whom the internees were required to report twice daily. Close association with the local residents-such as invitations to their homes-was in general forbidden and could result in deportation to a camp.158 It is therefore not astonishing that applications were even made for transfer from "free internment" to a camp, even though in far smaller numbers than vice versa. The reasons for requesting such transfer could be loneliness, lack of competent medical care, or simply the hope of being able to manage more cheaply in a communal kitchen.159

In October 1940 there were 2,412 "alien Jews" in internment camps and in "free internment," while 1,365 still lived at home. According to reports by the prefects, up to the end of 1942 the number of internees increased to 5,636 (2,139 in camps and 3,497 in villages). Up to the time of Mussolini's fall on 25 July 1943, the number reached almost 6,000, to which in addition more than 1,000 persons still living at home must be added. The increase is explained mainly by the arrival of approximately 2,000 refugees from the Croatian Ustasha state-these were brought from the annexed and occupied areas of Dalmatia on the Appenine Peninsula-and 507 shipwrecked victims from the "Pentcho," a wom-out ship from the Danube that had beached on the Island of Rhodes while en route to Palestine.160

For the entire duration of the internment until the beginning of the German occupation, the number of Jews who left Italy included at most 400 persons, most of whom arrived in South America via Lisbon. Among them were also approximately 80 Catholics who had been persecuted under Italian race laws and were traveling on a Vatican visa to Brazil.161

A study completed as early as 1941 in Ferramonti-Tarsia provides information about the nationality, native language, and religion of the internees. Of the 1,208 persons in custody there at that time, 38.5 percent were Germans and Austrians (the latter probably in the majority), 29.6 percent Poles, 22.4 percent stateless persons, 5.9 percent Czechs and Slovaks, and 3.6 percent other nationalities. Some 65.1 percent indicated German as their native language, 13.0 percent Yiddish, 10.1 percent Polish, and 11.7 percent specified a total of 11 other languages. Based on religious affiliation, there were 93.0 percent Jews, 6.2 percent Catholics, 0. 7 percent Protestants, and 0. 2 percent non-denominationals.162

Various entries in the files relating to cooperation between the German and Italian police indicate that in the spring of 1943 the "alien Jews" were threatened with deportation to Germany. In the preceding August, Mussolini had revealed his willingness to permit deportation when, in compliance with Ribbentrop's request that the Jews in the Italian-occupied parts of Croatia be handed over for deportation, he responded with a "no objection" (nulla obsta) although he was warned that it would mean their death. The deportation was impeded only by the opposition of the Italian military and the Italian Foreign Office.163

In and of itself, the wording of the German-Italian Police Agreement of 1936 offered no pretext for the deportation of Jews unless either party could claim special political reasons. Starting in 1939, there were in fact only a few Jews among the deportees to Germany. Until May 1942 the Gestapo adhered to the Convention. In four cases the Gestapo even rejected an offer for the extradition of Jews whom the Italian police wanted to get rid of because of trifling incidents such as passport forgery, currency smuggling, and an "offensive letter" to the Ministry of the Interior.164

In June 1942, without any perceptible political reason, the Gestapo accepted for the first time the extradition of a Jew who had fled to Italy a short time earlier to escape deportation.165 A week later it demanded the extradition of a Czech Jewish woman on the grounds that she was "generally suspicious." The Italian police understood the phrase, which dated, at the latest, from the arrests made during Hitler's 1938 state visit, to refer to all Jews.166 In another extradition request, this time involving a Polish Jewish woman who allegedly conducted espionage, the Italian Foreign Office raised an objection because the Agreement applied only to German and Italian citizens.167 It is uncertain whether the Foreign Office only now received knowledge of the secret Police Agreement or whether despite knowledge it chose not to interfere. During the war the Agreement had been gradually extended to groups of persons-citizens of occupied countries, deserters, and conscientious objectors-who originally had not been included.

At two discussions in December 1942 at which there were two representatives from the Department of the Interior and two from the Foreign Office as well as a legal expert from the University of Rome, it was agreed that in the future the extradition of Jews would require the approval of the Foreign Office.168 When the Foreign Office in April also raised an objection to the extradition of a deserter, the Ministry of the Interior forbade any further interference, stating that it would no longer feel bound by the position of the Foreign Office.

In a note of 10 May 1943 that was written to Mussolini but never shown to him, it was expressly suggested for the first time that the Jews as a special group be included in the Police Agreement, hence included in the extraditions.169 On 26 May the Director of the Office for Cooperation with German Police, Raffaele Ahanello, directed a letter to Giovanni Padellaro, Director of the Foreign Police handling alien registrations. In this letter, which vanished from the files, Padellaro was told to comply with the extradition requests of the Gestapo.

In a letter written immediately afterwards to the director of the Department for General and Secret Matters, who was the superior of both Alianello and Padellaro, Padellaro referred to the fact that the extradition requests by the Gestapo extended not only to German citizens "but also to the Jews who had been driven out of Germany (gli ebrei cacciati dalla Germania) and who do not have German citizenship, such as the stateless, Poles, Dutch, Belgian, French, etc." Ultimately this meant that all Jews who had emigrated and fled to Italy after 1933 and who resided abroad had lost German citizenship in November 1941.

At the time Padellaro referred to the discussions with the Foreign Office, which had added "plausible reasons of humanity," making it appear advisable to examine carefully every extradition request for non-Germans and Jews. In the draft text of the letter the addition "of humanity" is struck out. But that is precisely what Padellaro wanted to say.170 The high Italian police official's implicit intention not to become involved in the extradition of Jews raised the question whether the Gestapo had made concrete extradition demands for Jews to the Italian police between 10 and 26 May. Moreover, it is not known whether there were demands only in individual cases or whether an extensive, general extradition was being prepared. Indisputably there was danger ahead, and some segments of the Ministry of the Interior were prepared to comply with German requests. Otherwise, it would make no sense for Padellaro to have written his letter. Irrespective of these preparations, Italy as a sovereign nation did not extradite Jews to Germany, except for individual cases that fell under the Police Agreement.

During the 45 days of the Badoglio administration following Mussolini's fall, the situation of the "alien Jews" remained unchanged. The new regime, which emanated directly from the preceding regime and resembled a "reshuffling," hesitated to suspend the race legislation and to retract the internment of foreigners for fear of German disapproval. At the same time, however, it released a large share of the political prisoners, including also those Italian Jews who had been interned for political reasons.171

Only two days after the announcement of the ceasefire on 8 September, which included an agreement on the suspension of the internment, the police chief in a telegram to the prefects ordered the release of all aliens. They were given the choice of returning to their former place of residence in Italy or of remaining at the place of internment and continuing to accept a daily living allowance.172 During the general chaos in conjunction with disarming the Italian army, the telegram probably did not reach all the prefectures.

At the news of the German occupation, a general flight began at the internment centers. Fostered by the order of release,173 the flight led either in the direction of the Swiss border or toward the South where people hoped to be liberated soon by the Allies. During the first days after 8 September, the escape routes were still open to a large extent and train traffic was not subject to controls. Over 1,000 Jews, most of whom had saved themselves in the Italian Zone following the occupation of Southern France, broke out of the residence forcee in Saint-Martin Vesubie. After an arduous trip across the Alps that took their last strength, they arrived in Italian territory and were admitted by Italian border guards.174 A special train that the Italian military administration wanted to use for taking a group of internees from Saint Gervais to Nice was stranded in Italy. In this manner 400-600 people reached Rome, where they immediately went into hiding.175 By the end of September, approximately 3,000 Jews who were interned south of the Montecasino-Pescara. line were liberated by the Allies. Among these were approximately 1,500 in Ferramonfi-Tarsia and 150-200 in Campagna. Only a few succeeded in getting through the front line or in reaching security in boats along the coast.176 Still, by January 1944 approximately 1,000 Jewish emigrants and refugees were able to escape to Switzerland.177 The most favorable conditions for doing so were the places of internment in the vicinity of the border. Thus almost all internees in Aprica in the Sondrio province and in Saint Vincent in the Aosta Valley-altogether somewhat more than 200 persons, most of them from Croatia-succeeded in crossing into Swiss territory undetected.178

The first deportation in Italy occurred as early as mid-September 1943 from Meran.179 The raid to which 1,030 Jews fell victim was carried out in the old ghetto quarter on 16 October, and they were shipped off to Auschwitz in boxcars immediately afterwards.180 In the beginning of the deportations from Italy, a mobile special unit under the command of SS Hauptsturrnfuhrer Theo Dannecker was used; this mobile unit was supported by local units of the German security police and the German military police. Starting in November, the SS Standartenfuhrer Wilhelm Harster, commander of the Security Service and the Security Police in Verona, was put in charge of the arrest and deportation of Jews.181 The "Italian Social Republic" provided assistance to the German authorities by issuing decrees.

On 1 November the suspension of the internment of aliens was cancelled, and on 30 November it was ordered that Italian Jews be sent to concentration camps.182 From this time onwards, the arrests largely emanated from the Italian police, and within a brief period of time a network of 25 camps was created. In the process, several of the old camps such as Bagno a Ripoli near Florence, Civitella della. Chiana near Arezzo, and Scipione di Salsomaggiore near Parma were again used, but in addition there were also new ones such as Servigliano in the Ascoli Piceno province, Roccatederighi in the Grosseto province, Bagni di Lucca in Lucca province, and Villa Vo Vecchio in Padua province.183

Following the same pattern as in France and other occupied countries, a transit camp was set up in Fossoli near Carpi in the Modena province in late November 1943. In the beginning it was under Italian administration and was taken over in late February 1944 by German SS men. It existed until July 1944 and was then moved to Bozen-Gries due to partisan warfare on the plain surrounding the Po River. Apart from Fossoli, deportations to Auschwitz left from the city jails of Florence, Milan, Verona, and Mantua.184

The deportations from Trieste, which was situated in the "zone of operation of the Adriatic coastiand," were made independently and went to Auschwitz either directly or via the camp located in the rice mill of San Sabba. Toward the end of the war, deportees from Trieste were sent to Ravensbruck and Bergen- Belsen. San Sabba, which was controlled by the SS, is considered the only extermination camp in Italy. However, the mass murder of Italian and Yugoslavian partisans is definitely authenticated.185 The deportation of 343 Jews is attributed to the organization of the "Final Solution" in France. After crossing the Alpine pass of Saint-Martin Vesubie, they were seized in Italian territory and, after temporary internment in barracks in Borgo San Dalmazzo, were sent to Drancy via Savona and Nice.186

According to the most recent research, 6,815 Jews were deported from Italy, of whom only 799 survived. This figure includes the group from Borgo San Dalmazzo but not the Jews from Rhodes and Koos, which were part of the Italian possessions in the Aegean.187 According to older data, there were 1,915 emigrants and refugees as well as 210 persons of unknown nationality among the deportees.188 This means that more than one-fourth of them were deported, for after the liberation of Southern Italy up to the Montecasino- Pescara line, 6,500-7,000 came under the German occupation. After 8 September, approximately 2,000 of these Jews had fled from the French zone that had been under Italian occupation before this date.189

Hence, as in other occupied countries, the share was clearly higher than that of the Italian Jews, which was reported to be approximately 15 percent. It is not yet known in which part of Italy there were the greatest number of victims. With the exception of the deportation from Borgo San Dalmazzo, the number was probably particularly high in the central part of Italy-in Tuscany, Umbria, the Marches, and the Abruzzi, where most of the yet unliberated internment towns were situated and from which the escape route into Switzerland was too far and too dangerous.

After liberation, the care and redirection of survivors was entrusted by the Allied military administration to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommission, which started its activity in October 1943. In May 1944 a permanent representative of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees also participated. Under its aegis, officials of the joint, the Quakers, and the Friends Ambulance Unit that had experience in providing assistance to refugees did the practical work.190

Once again a significant number of Jewish refugees reached Italian soil when the German troops occupied the Dalmatian coast, which had been temporarily under the control of Yugoslav partisans after the departure of the Italians. In the spring of 1944, ships and boats landed almost daily along the Apulian coast near Bari where, in addition to Yugoslavian partisans, there were also 600-700 Jews, most of whom had been interned in Dalmatia during the Italian occupation.191 Jewish and non-Jewish emigrants also came to Italy with the Allied troops. These were persons who had either been trained in the United States for use in Europe or had been liberated from the French internment camps in North Africa.192

Until the end of the war a significant number of Jews who had emigrated or fled to Italy were able to go on to other countries. With assistance from the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1,478 holders of certificates departed together for Palestine in May 1944 and March 1945.193 One group of 1,000 rescued persons, most of them Jews, were admitted in May 1944 into the United States. They were housed in Fort Ontario near Oswego, New York, originally with the intention that they remain there until the end of the war. Subsequently, however, they were granted permanent residence.194

It is hardly possible to estimate just how many Jews who had emigrated or fled to Italy settled there permanently after the war. Possibly there could be several hundred, most of whom tried to go elsewhere. Unless from the outset they had another country in mind to which they could emigrate, they were appalled by conditions in the demolished cities of Italy. Altogether only four Jews expressed the wish to return to Germany in the service of the Allies for the purpose of looking for relatives and retrieving personal property.195

It is possible that in no other European country did the Jews experience the contrasts of tolerance and persecution, of hope and despair, that they underwent in Italy. Initially the toleration that even extended to assistance at the official level was mainly based on economic interests-shipping, tourism, and the acquisition of foreign currency- but also in the temporary foreign-policy friction that existed between Rome and Berlin.

The refugees encountered the hospitality of the Italian population, their historically rooted sympathy for outcasts and exiles, and an antisernitism that was not very widespread. Solidarity could be found not only among groups that were in more or less strong opposition to the fascist system, but also among its advocates and followers, to whom the increasing imitation of Hitlerian Germany and the ensuing racial policy seemed disastrous.

But even after the introduction of race legislation, the refugees had an opportunity to remain in Italy because numerous regulations, primarily the expulsion decrees of September 1938, were not fully implemented. With a tourist visa it was even possible for approximately 5,000 people to escape the Nazi murderers. From the simple policeman to the highest ranks of the ministry and army, people often encountered a humane attitude that placed greater value on the fate of the individual than the importance of following regulations and the undifferentiated loyalty to a political and ideological system. In this respect Italy differed greatly from Germany.

The persecution that was initiated mainly by Mussolini, the Fascist Party, and the Ministry of the Interior was weakened by rivalries within the bureaucratic machinery. Consequently it was possible for Jews to receive some protection from the Foreign Office, the army, and the lower levels of the bureaucracy. During the republic of Salo, Mussolini and the fanatic fascists who remained faithful to him were henchmen of the German police and the SS in arrest and deportation. On the other hand, it cannot go unmentioned that there were numerous officials in the government who worked together with the resistance movement. They courageously issued false documents without which survival would hardly have been possible.

Basically the criticism that the practice of sealing off borders was initiated at precisely the time when escape from the Nazi area of domination became a matter of life and death must apply to almost all democratic countries as well as to the fascist regime. Over the course of 12 years of Nazi domination, more than 18,000 Jewish emigrants and refugees-mainly Germans, Austrians, Croatians, and Poles, plus an additional 5,000 Jews, most of whom had been living in Italy before 1933-found refuge in Italy. Approximately 2,000 of them were deported.

The number of persons rescued may seem high. But it was modest given the country's capacity for providing a haven and the goodwill of extensive segments of the Italian population. This was all the more true in light of adverse political conditions. The image of Italy was characterized by racial policy, danger of expulsion, and possible cooperation with the Nazis in extradition, as well as by the close ideological and foreign policy ties between fascism and Nazism. Nonetheless, the humanitarian aspects of Italian society constituted a counterweight that cannot be overlooked.


87. Leone, Le organizzazioni, pp. 232-35; David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai 1938-45 (New York, 1976), pp. 86-89.

88. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/Al/4: Ministry for People's Culture, General Direction for Tourism, to the Ministry of the Interior, 18 Nov. 1938; circulars from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 3 Dec. 1938 (443/56442) and 24 Oct. 1938 (443/79790).

89. Bernhard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford, 1979), p. 44.

90. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 2/A5/1: Statistics of the Ministry of the Interior according to the replies of the prefects to the circular of 4 Apr. 1939 (443/60601).

91. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, Mass. S. 11.87.12 Stranieri di razza ebraica: letter from the questor at Venice to the Ministry of the Interior, 19 Aug. 1939 (443/76596).

92. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 2/A5/1: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 19 Aug. 1939 (443/76596).

93. ACS, Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale per la Demografia e la Razza (1915-44), Busta 2/20/Ebrei stranieri: Ministry of the Interior to the Foreign Ministry, 24 Aug. 1939, Situazione ebrei stranieri residenti in Italia.

94. ACS, PS 1930-44, Busta 721, Mass. S. 11.87/14 Stranieri di razza ebraica: circularfromtheMinistryoftheInteriortotheprefects,28jan.1939(443/3285).

95. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Imperia: replies from the prefect of Imperia to the telegram of the Ministry of the Interior of 16 Mar. 1939 (443/25522).

96. NA, State Department file 1930-1939, 840.48 (Refugees)/1913: letter from Walter H. Sholes to the Department of State, Milan, 11 Sept. 1939.

97. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Imperia: letter from the prefect of Imperia to the Ministry of the Interior, 11 July 1939.

98. Ibid.: Appunto, Rome, 21 July 1939, depending on the report of Achille Peruzzi, 18 July 1939.

99. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta I/A3/1: telegram from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefect of Milan, 24 July 1939; prefect of Milan to the Ministry of the Interior, 11 Jan. 1940.

100. Various materials in ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 11/Imperia and 15/Savona.

101. UCII, 44 H Delasem/Correspondenza L.V. Valobra: letter from Mario Totele to Lelio Vittorio Valobra, Alassio, 5 Sept. 1940; Leone, Le organizzazioni, p. 191.

110. Material in ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta. 3/A1, and PS 1903-49, Ufficio RG, Busta 8, RG 28/Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo.

111. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, S. 11.87.26 Respinti perchc. muniti di visto d'ingresso rilasciato in contrasto con le norme vigenti, and ibid., S. 11.87/12: Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of the Interior, 28 Nov. 1939.

112. Ibid., S. 11.87.25: letter from the prefect of Trieste to the Ministry of the Interior, 20 Mar. 1940; UCII, 44 L Delasem/Trieste: Comitato Italiano di Assistenza agli Ebrei Emigranti to Dante Almansi, UCII, Trieste, 14 Apr. 1940, with an enclosed memorandum.

113. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 1/Al/9, Registri degh ebrei stranieri segnalati in entrata Regno per il transito e che non risultano usciti.

114. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 721, S. 11.87.12 Stranieri di razza ebraica: telegram from the Foreign Ministry to all embassies and consulates, 23 Apr. 1940; circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 25 Apr. 1940 (443/29489).

115. Ibid.: circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 18 May 1940 (443/35466).

116. On Aliyah Bet in general, see Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, pp. 40- 80; Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish joint Distribution Committee 1939-45 (Detroit, 1981), pp. 129-51.

117. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 4/C6/5: Foreign Ministry to Ministry of the Interior, 30 Oct. 1939; Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe, p. 52.

118. ACS, PS. A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta. 6ID2/6: Ministry of Transport to Ministry of the Interior, 17 Sept. 1938.

119. Ibid., Busta 6/132/25 and 33: correspondence on illegal immigration to Palestine.

120. Ibid., Busta 6/132/3, concerning Wilhelm Perl's plans for embarkation. See William R. Perl, Operation Action: Rescue from the Holocaust (New York, 1983), pp. 91-98, 281f., 405-07, and Elio Levi, -Episodi di vita ebraica milanese fra le due guerre mondiali," in Scritti in memoria di Leone Carpi: Saggi sull'ebraismo italiano, ed. Daniel Carpi, Attilio Milano, and Alexander Roif6 Uerusalem, 1967), pp. 229-240, esp. p. 239.

121. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 6/D2/25: correspondence on the departure of the "Colorado" from Brindisi.

122. Ibid., Busta 4/C6/1: Foreign Ministry to Ministry of the Interior, 15 Nov. 1939, and ibid., Busta 11/Genova: Ministry of the Interior to the questor of Genoa, 19 Jan. 1940.

123. JDC, 718 General. 1937-39. Situation of Refugees in Italy: Report on the Problem of Jewish Refugees in Italy (Genoa, Dec. 1939), p. 10. This is the English translation of the first general report of the Delasern for the joint. Italian copy in UCII, 44 P Delasem/Assistenza.

124. Ibid., esp. Lelio Vittorio Valobra, Situation of Italian Jewry, Feb. 1940.

125. Ibid.: letter from Olga Syrkus, Milan, to JDC, New York, 7 Mar. 1940.

126. Ibid.: Valobra, Situation of Italian Jewry, p. 3.

127. Ibid.: Auszug aus den Berichten des Cornitato di Assistenza per gli Ebrei Profughi 1937; Report on the Problem of Jewish Refugees, p. 4 (see above, n. 123).

128. Ibid.: reports of the Chief Rabbi of Milan, Dr. Gustavo Castelbolognesi, to JDC, Amsterdam, Milan, 12 and 26 Oct. 1939.

129. Ibid.: Report on the Problem of Jewish Refugees, p. 10.

130. See above, n. 128.

131. Philadelphia, American Friends Service Committee [hereafter cited as AFSCI, Refugee Services, Italy/Refugee Program 1939: correspondence.

132. Lutz-Eugen Reutter, Katholische Kirche als Fluchthelfer im Dritten Reich: Die Betreuung von Auswanderern durch den St. Raphaels-Verein (Recklinghausen- Hamburg, 1971), pp. 155-57.

133. Concerning the internment in France, see esp. Hanna Schramm and Barbara Vormeier, Vivre d Gurs: Un camp de concentration fran~ais 1940-1941 (Paris, 1979), and Gilbert Badia and others, Les barb&s de 1'exil: budes sur 1'6migration allemande et autrichienne (1938-1940) (Grenoble, 1979).

134. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 734, Provvedimenti da adottare in caso di guerra a carico di stranieri, J 4/21 Affari generali: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 16 Aug. and 31 Aug. 1939 (443/06687 and 443/43427).

135. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 1/2: Campi di concentramento. Corrispondenza varia: Buffarini-Guidi to Bocchini, 26 May 1940; see Gina Antoniani Persichilh, "Disposizioni normative e fonti archivistici per lo studio dell'internamento in Italia (giugno 1940-lugho 1943)," in Rassegna degli archivi de Stato 38 (1978): 77-96, esp. p. 89.

136. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 734/A, Provvedimenti da adottare in caso di guerra a carico di stranieri. Affari generah: Foreign Ministry to Ministry of the Interior, 15 June 1940.

137. ACS, PS, A 16 Ebrei stranieri, Busta 8/1314: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 15 June 1940 (443/08223); see also Sorani, L'assistenza, pp. 59-84.

138. Frantz Hajek, "Appunti sugh ebrei stranieri in Italia durante la gueffa," in Gli ebrei in Italia durante il fascismo, ed. Guido Valabrega (Milan, 1963), pp. 153- 57, esp. p. 155.

139. The most important report, written immediately after the arrest by Hermann Strauss, a collaborator of the Quakers, can be found in AFSC, Refugee Services, Italy/Refugee Program. Numerous other reports dating from 1950s and 1960s can be found in Milan, Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea [hereafter cited as CDEC], Fondo Israel Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze.

140. UCII, 44 H Delasem, Corrispondenza Valobra: Lelio Vittorio Valobra to Dante Almansi, 3 July 1940; eye-witness reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, as above, n. 139.

141. Francesco Folino, Ferramonti un lager di Mussolini: Gli internati durante la guerra (Cosenza, 1985). The book consists mainly of name lists.

142. This figure and some of the following information are taken from the files on single provinces in ACS, PS, M 4-16 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 13-56, and PS, A 4bis Stranieri internati, Busta 1-10.

143. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 6/20, Campi di concentramento, ove sono internati ebrei, 9 Mar. 1941. The total number of 40 camps is based on various documents from the prefects in ACS, PS, A 4bis, Busta 1-10.

144. Itala Jacoponi, "Campi di concentramento in Abruzzo durante il secondo conflitto mondiale. Nereto," in Rivista Abruzzese di Studi Storici dal Fascisimo alla Resistenza 4 (1983): 325-36, and "Campi di concentramento in Abruzzo durante la guerra 1940-1945. Notaresco," ibid 5 (1984): 131-51.

145. ACS, PS, M 4-16, Busta 25, Cosenza, M3 Ferramonti campo di concentramento: Ministry of the Interior, Note, 10 Aug. 1941, with a handwritten "si" by Mussolini; PS, A 4bis Stranieri internati, Busta 2/14 Cosenza: General Inspector of the Police S. Li Voti to Ministry of the Interior, 30 July 1941. See also Folino, Ferramonti, passim.

146. "Decreto del Duce del Fascismo, Capo del Governo, 4. Sept. 1940," in Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 239 (11 Oct. 1940).

147. For instance in ACS, PS, M 4-16, Busta 25/P6: General Inspector of the Police S. Li Voti to Ministry of the Interior, 16 May 1942; CDEC, Fondo Kalk 11/1/3 Ferramonti. AutoritA di custodia e di sorveglianza: Kalk's notes on the physician of the camp, Mario Rossi, based on reports from former internees and the memoirs of jehoshua Halevi, Habaita (Homeward) (Tel- Aviv, 1951).

148. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 12/43/1 Campi di concentramento gestiti da autoritA militari. Campo di Renicci di Anghiari: telegram from Borgo San Sepolcro to the Ministry of the Interior, 10 Sept. 1943.

149. See the autobiographical reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze.

150. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 3/11 Campi di concentramento. Affari generali. Sussidi agli internati e loro famiglie: Notes, 21 Sept. 1940, 13 Apr. 1941, and 1 July 1943, each with Mussolini's "si" on the margin.

151. Ibid., Busta 11/31 Campi di concentramento. Vigilanza ad assistenza sanitaria: reports of the inspectors. Further autobiographical reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze.

152. CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1-2 Testimonianze. The contemporaneous diaries known to date are by Maria Eisenstein, L'internata numero 6: Donne fra i reticolati del campo di concentramento (Rome, 1944); Hermann Hakel, Situationen (typewritten manuscript) in Vienna, Dokumentationsarchiv des 6sterreichischen Widerstands, DOW 12923. Extracts have been published in Hakel's Vienna review Lynkeus: "Aus den Tagebfichern 1938-1943," Lynkeus (Aug. 1981): 7-20; "Traun-deben," ibid, pp. 26-35 and 40-45; "Aus 'KZ auf italienisch'," Lynkeus (Nov./Dec. 1982): 22-29.

153. ACS, see n. 151.

154. NA, RG 331, Box 402, Reference 10 000/164 Displaced Persons, 1676 Ferramonti Camp: Allied Control Commission, Public Health SubCommission, Report on Ex-Internees Camp Ferramonti, 16 Apr. 1944, Appendix 2.

155. CDEC, Fondo Kalk, 11/1 Feffamonti: Campo-Vertretung; see also Israel Kalk, "I campi di concentramento italiani per ebrei profughi: Ferramonti-Tarsia (Cosenza)," in Gli ebrei in Italia durante il fascismo (Turin, 1961), pp. 63-71.

156. Autobiographical reports in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, V11/1-2 Testimonianze, and 11/2 Ferramonti.

157. CDEC, Fondo Kalk, 11/1 Ferramonti: Bambini nati durante il periodo di internamento. The same figure is given in the Report on Ex-Internees Camp (see above, n. 154).

158. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 741/A Stranieri internati. Affari generah: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 8 and 25 June 1940 (442/12267 and 442/14178); Busta 741j, Lavoro ai confinati e internati politici: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 4 June 1941.

159. Some examples in UCII, 44 M, 44 N and 44 0 Delasem, Richieste internati stranieri.

160. Voigt, "Notizie statistiche," p. 412f.; concerning the "Pentcho," see John Bierman, Odyssey: The Last Great Escape from Nazi-Dominated Europe (New York, 1984).

161. Voigt, "Notizie statisfiche," p. 413f.

162. CDEC, Fondo Kalk 11/1 Ferramonti: L. FUr 94, A. Rosenbach, Ferramonti- Tarsia, Das Leben der Zivilinternierten in Zahlen (Ferramonfi-Tarsia, 1941), typewritten manuscript.

163. Daniel Carpi, "The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia," in Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, April 1974 Uerusalem, 1977), pp. 465-525, especially pp. 474-75, 511.

164. ACS, PS 1903-44, Ufficio RG, Busta 9, RG 22 (1940) Richieste d'infor- mazioni alla Gestapo: correspondence about Johann Bony; Busta 10, RG 39 (1940) Informazioni varie alla Gestapo: correspondence about Alex- ander Scheibel; Busta 12, RG 28 (1942) Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo: correspondence about Ivan Kahn and Ruth Tichauer.

165. Ibid., Busta 13, Anno 1942, no. 3701-3800: correspondence about Giinther Steinitz.

166. Ibid., Busta 13, Anno 1942, no. 3801-3900: correspondence about Julie Brunelikova.

167. Ibid., Busta 11, RG 28 (1941) Richieste d'informazioni dalla Gestapo, no. 3273-3404: correspondence about Jadwiga Puzyna.

168. Ibid., Busta 11, Massima (1942): Note, Rome, 16 Dec. 1942.

169. Ibid., Busta 11, Massima (1942): Appunto per il Duce, Rome, 10 May 1943 with a handwritten supplement in the margin below: "The note has not been presented to the Duce. His Excellency the Chief of Police has ordered that the opinion of the Foreign Ministry does not preempt our decisions"; a handwritten draft also in Busta 14, Anno 1942, no. 3901-4062.

170. ACS, PS 1930-55, Busta 729, Trattati e convenzioni internazionali, Massima T (1939-1943): Appunto per il Sig. Capo Divisione, 28 May 1940.

171. See esp. Giuseppe Mayda, Ebrei sotto Sal6: La persecuzione antisemita 1943-45 (Milan, 1978), pp. 51-61.

172. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 13/57 Campi di concentra- mento. Affari generali. Armistizio. Liberazione sudditi nemici internati: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 10 Sept. 1943, 9 h 45 (451/53247).

173. Mayda, Ebrei sotto Sal6, p. 63f.; Sergio Vizio, "Gli ebrei croati in Alba 1942-1945," in Notiziario dell'Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Cuneo e provincia, no. 28 (Sept. 1985): 117-127, esp. 126.

174. Alberto Cavaglion, Nella notte straniera: Gli ebrei di S. Martin V6subie e il campo di Borgo S. Dalmazzo (Cuneo, 1981), pp. 59ff.

175. JDC, Saly Mayer Archives 47: A. Furmanski and A. Kaszterstein to Marc Jarblum, Rome, 10 Oct. 1943; Settimio Sorani to Saly Mayer, Rome, 15 Mar. 1944.

176. JDQ Countries, 720 Situation of Refugees in Italy 1943-45: Allied Forces Headquarters, Military Government Section, Conditions of Jews in Italy, Sicily and Sardegna, 8 Feb. 1944; ACS, PS, A 4bis Stranieri internati, Busta 9/66 Croce Rossa Italiana: camp administration of Ferramonti to the Ministry of the Interior, 12 May 1943; camp adminis- tration of Campagna to the Ministry of the Interior, 5 May 1943 (replies in 448/309817). Examples of reports of escape, in CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1 Testimonianze: Herbert Landau, Nel turbine della Liberazione; and Jerusalem, Yad Vashem Archives, 0-3/3532: Report of Edward Hosiasson.

177. JDC, Saly Mayer Archives 47: Lelio Vittorio Valobra, Aiuti agh ebrei italiani e stranieri che si trovano in Italia (this report was sent on 28 Jan. 1944 to Saly Mayer, the representative of the Joint in Switzerland). On the escape-routes to Switzerland, see Michele Sarfatti, "Dopo 1'8 set- tembre: Gli ebrei e la rete confinaria italo-svizzera," in Rassegna mensile di Israel (June-July 1981): 150-73.

178. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 5/37 Sondrio: Carabinieri Tirano to Ministry of the Interior, 11 Sept. 1943; Busta 1/2 Aosta: Prefect of Aosta to Ministry of the Interior, 14 Sept. 1943; CDEC, Fondo Kalk, VII/1 Testimonianze: Azriel Levi, Confinati a San Vincenzo della Fonte.

179. Liliana Picciotto-Fargion, "Die Deportation der juden aus Italien: Statis- tische Untersuchung," to be published as part of a volume, ed. Wolfgang Benz, on the number of Jewish victims in Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte ffir Zeitgeschichte (Munich).

180. See Liliana Picciotto-Fargion, L'occupazione tedesca e gli ebrei di Roma (Rome, 1979).

181. Liliana Picciotto-Fargion, "Polizia tedesca ed ebrei nell'Italia occupata," in Rivista di Storia Contemporanea, no. 3 (Turin, 1984): 456-71; Raul Hilberg, Vernichtung, pp. 455-66.

182. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 13/54 Campi di concentra- mento. Armistizio. Liberazione sudditi nemici internati: Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 1 Nov. 1943 (451/22386); ACS, RSI, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Gabinetto, Busta 33/3/2-2/13: Ministry of the Interior to the heads of the provinces, Ordine di polizia no. 5, 30 Nov. 1943.

183. ACS, PS, M 4 Mobilitazione civile, Busta 9/25/1/18 Varie: Campi di concentramento, s.d. (Spring 1944).

184. See above, n. 179, 181.

185. Picciotto-Fargion, "Die Deportation der Juden," section on "Die Depor- tation der Juden aus Triest" and table 2a.

186. Ibid., section on "Die Deportation der juden aus Borgo San Dalmazzo- and table 7.

187. Ibid., table 7.

188. Giuliana Donati, Ebrei in Italia: Deportazione, Resistenza (Florence, 1974), P. 9.

189. Voigt, "Notizie statistiche," pp. 415f.

190. NA, RG 331, Box 26, Ref. 10 000/100 Allied Military Government, 432 Displaced Persons Subcommission, Political Section: Functions of For- eign Internees and DP-Persons Subcommission, Oct. 1943; JDC, Mem- orandum: Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in Italy and the joint Distribution Committee, 9 June 1944, and further material.

191. Voigt, "Notizie statistiche," p. 418.

192. See Michel Abitboll Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord sous Vichy (Paris, 1983), pp. 157-59. Examples in International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigr6s 1933-45, p. 271 (Hans Escher); p. 771 (YJaus Mann); p. 1215 (Jean Weidt).

193. NA, RG 331, Box 397, Ref. 10 000/164 Displaced Persons, 905 Evacuation of Refugees to Middle-East: The Story of the Second Convoy to Palestine, 4 Apr. 1945.

194. Ruth Gruber, Haven: The Unknown Story of 1000 World War II Refugees (New York, 1984).

195. NA, RG 331, Box 409a, Ref. 10 000/164 Displaced Persons, 2463 Repa- triation Germany.

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